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645 Property Lawyers India This leads us to the consideration of the statements of Bengali and Noor Mohammad which were received in corroboration of Kashinath’s testimony. 171-A of the Sea Customs Act. Mr Newman of that firm made a witness statement in which he said that hotels of the Four Seasons chains were owned by different owners, who entered into agreements with “a number of Four Seasons entities” covering “licensing, management and advisory issues. At this point, Messrs Kennedys came on to the scene, acting for Holdings.

They applied to set aside the order of Master Yoxall. With regard to the first question, Mr. It is admitted that the appellant is a dealer in shares (1) [1914] A. Mr Donovan responded by reasserting that the contract was made with Holdings. The basis of this assertion was said to be that internet research suggested that Holdings was the parent company of the Four Seasons group, that it operated a central reservation system and website for the worldwide chain, and that it was the owner and licensor of the trade marks used by the Cairo hotel.

Agreeing with the “comprehensive” analysis in Cooley, he held that the two schemes – in the Regulation and the Rules – were “fundamentally different in structure and policy” (para 41). In the next case, Wink v Croatia Osiguranje DD [2013] EWHC 1118 (QB), where the claimant had been seriously injured in a road accident while on holiday in Croatia, a spirited attack upon the correctness of Booth and Cooley was mounted before Haddon Cave J, arguing that 6BPD should be interpreted consistently with European law, so that in a claim where both direct and indirect damage is alleged it is only the place where the direct damage is sustained which is relevant.

1(9)(a); the natural and ordinary meaning of “damage” is any damage; the defendant’s argument was tantamount to saying that damage was sustained only where the injury occurs, which is plainly not so in many cases; it was this construction rather than that in Booth which required re-writing (paras 33-35). Holdings was a “management company” which did not own either the Cairo or the Park Lane hotel and had no contractual relationship with either of them.

It was stated that though the appellant was a dealer in shares it was not acquiring the shares of Elphinstone Mills as its stock-in-trade. 2,34,230/- was a capital accretion on the sale of shares and did not represent income from the business in shares of the appellant. Mehta appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that the sum of Rs. ” The Cairo hotel was owned by Nova Park. As they are not made subject to the safeguards under which confessions are recorded by Magistrates they must be specially scrutinised to finding out if they were made under threat or promise from some, one in authority.

Section 30 of the Evidence Act does not limit itself to confessions made to Magistrates, nor do the earlier sections do so, and hence there is no bar to its proper application to the statements such as we have here. The judge pointed to a number of obvious problems with this argument: there are no such limiting words in 6BPD, para 3. Section 2(h) defines “expenditure” as meaning “any sum in money or money’s worth, spent or disbursed or for the spending or disbursing of which a liability has been incurred by an assessee, and includes any amount which under the provisions of this Act is required to be included in the taxable expenditure”.

The argument was put forward that the appellant was a controlled concern of Mulraj Kersondas and it was a shareholder also of the Managing Agency Company and therefore it was interested in the Managing Agency. In our opinion there is no justification for the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant. Section 2(g) defines “dependent” as meaning “(i) where the assessee is an individual, his or, her spouse or child wholly or mainly dependent on the assessee for support and maintenance; (ii) where the assessee is a Hindu undivided family -(a) every coparcerner other than the karta; and (b) any other member of the family who under any law or order or decree of a India High Court Property Lawyers, is entitled to maintenance from the joint family India Property Advocates“.

The question is, can they be used to corroborate him? They also mention the name of Haroon, among others, as being concerned in the smuggling and in much the same way as does the accomplice. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but are statements made in answer to a notice under S. If after such scrutiny they are considered to be voluntary, they may be received against ,the maker and in the same way as confessions are received, also against a co-accused jointly tried with him.

These statements contain admission constituting the guilt of the makers under the charged sections. Section 3 which imposes the charge of expenditure-tax provides “Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April, 1958, a tax (hereinafter referred to as expenditure-tax) at the rate or rates specified in the Schedule in respect of the expenditure incurred by any individual or Hindu undivided family in the previous year: 2 defines an “assessee” as meaning “an individual or a Hindu undivided family by whom expenditure- tax or any other sum of money is payable under this Act, and includes every individual or Hindu undivided family against whom any proceeding under this Act has been taken for the assessment of his expenditure”.

The appellant had purchased the shares of the Elphinstone Mills not with a view to deal with them as a dealer Property Advocates in India shares but with a view to support the Managing Agents of the Elphinstone Mills. Master Cook set aside the order for service out on the ground that in the face of Mr Newman’s evidence these assertions were not enough to support the contention that Lady Brownlie had contracted with Holdings or that Holdings was vicariously liable for the driver of the car.

These statements are not confessions recorded by a Magistrate under S.