advocates in Supreme Court of India – http://supremecourtindia.in/in-the-governments-appeal-to-the-supreme-court/. David Richards J’s conclusion produced a coherent, if unattractive and quite possibly unintended, outcome, which paid proper, if reluctant, regard to the applicable provisions of the 1986 Act and the 1986 Rules. Moreover, the Court of Appeal noted at para 59 that, as the Court of Appeal emphasised in The Saga Cob in the passage cited at para 32 above, one has to look at the reality of the particular situation in the context of all the evidence, to ascertain whether the particular event was sufficiently likely to occur to have become an attribute of the port.
Lewison LJ thought, at paras 108 and 109 of his judgment, that “a limited solution is better than no solution at all”. The Civil Judge dismissed the respondent’s applications. Section 22 and others are the machinery sections to determine the amount of tax. In appeal, this Court, Held: (i) The respondent was a ‘person interested’ within s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, But, before the references were made, the respondent, who was a decree holder against the lessee, attached the lessee’s share of the compensation amount in execution of his decree.
The ratio of that decision applies to the facts of the present case. The answer given by the Court of Appeal was obviously not; whether, in such circumstances, there would be a breach of the safe port warranty, or the event would be a characterised as an abnormal occurrence, would necessarily depend on an evidential evaluation of the particular event giving rise to the damage and the relevant history of the port.
The Court of Appeal focused on these examples in the instant case: does the mere fact that it is “foreseeable” from the location of San Francisco that earthquakes may occur top lawyers in Supreme Court of India its vicinity, or from the location of Syracuse, beneath Mount Etna, that there may be volcanic explosions best law firms in Supreme Court India its vicinity, predicate that any damage caused to vessels in those ports from such events, were they to occur in the future, would flow from the “normal characteristics or attributes” of those ports, and therefore necessarily involve a breach of any safe port warranty?
At their instance, references were made to the Civil Court under s. In our opinion, the notices issued in the year 1955 are valid notices so far as they relate to the period commencing from February 1, 1953 to 31-10-55. The High Court, held: (1) that the respondent was a person interested in the compensation within the meaning of s. I would agree with that approach if the court had been simply seeking to arrive at as reasonable and commercial a result as possible: a partially unreasonable and uncommercial outcome would be preferable to a generally unreasonable and uncommercial outcome.
The land of the appellant was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the compensation was apportioned between the appellant and his lessee. Otherwise the consequences of a mere foreseeability test lead to wholly unreal and impractical results. 3 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act and was therefore entitled to claim that he should be allowed to join as a party; and (ii) that the revision petitions were competent.
As to the first, the Court of Appeal noted in para 58 that the conclusion that nobody at the port could be surprised that both the above events occurred at the same time appears to have been based on the idea that, provided an event is theoretically foreseeable as possibly occurring at the relevant port, because of the port’s location, then that is enough to qualify the event as a “characteristic of the port”.
Quite apart from this, while the solution adopted by the Court of Appeal deals with the lacuna as it applies on the facts of the present case, it would not provide a complete answer. It was said that the case should have been remanded by the High Court to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh finding on the point. 717 of 1966 it was argued for the appel- lant that the High Court erred in assuming that in the transactions in question the goods were delivered for consumption outside the Madras State.
top law firms in Supreme Court India my opinion they were correct so to hold. The High Court has, however, taken the view that the transactions took place advocates in Supreme Court India 1955-56 and ordinarily accounts of dealings would not be retained by the assessee beyond five years. Subsequently the respondent withdrew the lessee’s share of the compensation amount in execution of his decree. The High Court has observed that apart from this the transactions were very large in number, about 4000 and odd and most of them were for a comparatively small value.
The appellant and his lessee, filed a compromise petition before the Civil Judge and the respondent also applied to be impleaded as party to the References. Some of the invoices referred in the assessment order show that they were for small amounts in regard to articles like paint, aluminium, tar and other articles. In these circumstances the High Court came to the conclusion that the goods were delivered to places outside the Madras State for the purpose of consumption top lawyers in Supreme Court India the deliver States.
The Court of Appeal concluded that both reasons were fallacious. However, when it comes to deciding the meaning of a legislative provision, judges are primarily concerned with arriving at a coherent interpretation, which, while taking into account commerciality and reasonableness, pays proper regard to the language of the provision interpreted in its context. The appellant claimed that be was entitled to the whole of the compensation while his, lessee claimed a larger share. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s solution would not help in a case where the administration preceding a liquidation had not been a distributing administration, a situation in which the unfairness of a lacuna would be even more marked.
The respondent thereupon, filed revision petitions in the High Court. Thus, the solution would only apply to any surplus which had been in the hands of the administrator, and it could only be invoked by creditors who had lodged proofs in the administration.