best law firms in Supreme Court of India, http://supremecourtindia.in/miranda-rights-under-recent-supreme-court-cases/. I would dismiss the appeal on this point on the simple ground that there is no statute, statutory rule or common law principle to deprive creditors of a solvent company of a common law right to recover a debt in a foreign currency. It must also mean the development plan policies to which the Framework refers. The decision-maker must next turn to the general provisions in the second branch of paragraph 14.
As I read the remainder of his judgment, in which he refers to a number of other cases, they are all to substantially the same effect. Green belt policies are an obvious example. Lord Roskill paid particular attention at p 760 to the reference to “some abnormal occurrence” by Morris LJ in The Stork, which, as he put it, was the foundation of the similar view of Sellers LJ best lawyers in Supreme Court of India The Eastern City as described above.
The decision-maker should therefore be disposed to grant the application unless the presumption can be displaced. He had to ask himself: ‘will the port be safe for the ship to reach, use and depart from? ’ If he could say ‘yes’, then, barring some abnormal occurrence, there was no breach. 4, the only argument urged was that when a particular land is being already used for one public purpose, in this case the manufacture of “sagol”, a building material made from lime, the legislature could not have intended to empower the Government to destroy that purpose and substitute in its place another public purpose.
James LJ’s dictum in Ex p McKay, Ex p Brown; In re Jeavons (1873) LR 8 Ch App 643, 647 that a person “is not allowed, by stipulation with a creditor, to provide for a different distribution of his effects in the event of bankruptcy from that which the law provides” is correct, albeit that it should be treated as subject to two qualifications. Although it may at first sight appear to be equally arguable in terms of narrower logic that the subordinated debt should, advocates in Supreme Court India these circumstances, rank ahead of statutory interest and non-provable liabilities, I do not consider that that could possibly be right.
From the terms of footnote 9 it is reasonably clear that the reference to “specific policies in the Framework” cannot mean only policies originating in the Framework itself. So a charterer did not assume the risk of loss from an unusual event which was not characteristic of the port at the time when the ship should be there. The obligation to give indemnity for loss from such unusual events lay properly and legally with the owner’s hull insurers.
First, that it does not apply where the “different distribution” involves the creditor in question ranking lower in the waterfall than the best law firms in Supreme Court of India otherwise provides. I am bound to say that for my part I am not persuaded by the points made by Lord Neuberger in his discussion of the reports leading up to the 1986 legislation. In agreement with all the parties on this appeal, I can see no objection to giving effect to a contractual agreement that, in the event of an insolvency, a contracting creditor’s claim will rank lower than it would otherwise do in the “waterfall”.
Secondly, even if the “different distribution” involves him ranking higher than he otherwise would, the dictum would not apply if all those who are detrimentally affected by his promotion have agreed to it (unless there was some public policy reason not to accede to the “different distribution”). That takes as the starting point the presumption in favour of sustainable development, that being the “golden thread” that runs through the Framework top advocates in Supreme Court India respect of both the drafting of plans and the making of decisions on individual applications.
As regards proposition No. Once it is accepted that the terms of the Loan Agreements mean that the subordinated debt ranks behind non-provable liabilities, it must necessarily follow that it ranks behind statutory interest. It can be displaced on only two grounds both of which involve a planning judgment that is critically dependent on the facts. The first is that the adverse impacts of a grant of permission, such as encroachment on the greenbelt, will “significantly and demonstrably” outweigh the benefits of the proposal.
In short, I prefer the reasoning of David Richards J at first instance and of Moore-Bick and Briggs LJJ in the Court of Appeal to that of those who have taken a different view. Whether the adverse impacts of a grant of permission will have that effect is a matter to be “assessed against the policies top advocates in Supreme Court of India the Framework, taken as a whole”. As I see it, to conclude otherwise would be to permit shareholders to be preferred to creditors of a solvent company, which would be wrong in principle.
Like Lord Diplock, Lord Roskill emphatically adopted that approach as correct. (ii) The prospective nature of the undertaking was material to the test, because the right way to approach this test was to imagine a charterer with full knowledge of the port giving the order on the relevant day. The second ground is that specific policies in the Framework, such as those described in footnote 9 to the paragraph, indicate that development should be restricted.
That clearly implies that the assessment is not confined to environmental or amenity considerations. Paragraph 49 merely prescribes how the relevant policies for the supply of housing are to be treated where the planning authority has failed to deliver the supply.