best law firms in Supreme Court India – http://supremecourtindia.in/supreme-court-of-pakistan/; They are the responsibility of the ship’s hull insurers (if owners have insured) or of owners themselves. The Court of Appeal disagreed, and considered that LBHI2 could prove for the subordinated debt at any time. Lump sum orders are expressly provided for by section 2(1)(b). In the case of current spouses or civil partners, subsections 1(2)(a) and (aa) say that reasonable financial provision is what it would be reasonable for the applicant to receive, whether or not required for maintenance.
He ordered, from a very large estate, provision which included housing, but he did so by way not of an outright capital sum but of a life interest in a trust fund together with power of advancement designed to cater for the possibility of care expenses in advanced old age. That common ground was based on the classic dictum of Sellers LJ in The Eastern City [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127, 131 that: top advocates in Supreme Court of India the Court of Appeal Longmore LJ (giving the judgment of the court) noted in para 14 that it was common ground between the parties that, if the damage sustained by the vessel at Kashima on 24 October 2006 was caused by an “abnormal occurrence”, then the charterers would not have been in breach of the safe port warranty.
It will very often be more appropriate, as well as cheaper and more convenient for other beneficiaries and for executors, if income is provided by way of a lump sum from which both income and capital can be drawn over the years, for example on the Duxbury model familiar to family lawyers (see Duxbury v Duxbury (Note) [1992] Fam 62). The LBIE administrators contend that it would not be open to LBHI2 to lodge a proof in LBIE’s administration for the subordinated debt until all “Senior Liabilities” have been paid best advocates in Supreme Court India full.
David Richards J accepted that contention, on the ground that clause 7(d) and/or (e) had the effect of precluding the lodging of a proof. But it is necessary to remember that the statutory power is to provide for maintenance, not to confer capital on the claimant. They said that charterers do not assume responsibility for unexpected and abnormal events which occur suddenly and which create conditions of unsafety after they have given the order to proceed to the relevant port.
The level at which maintenance may be provided for is clearly flexible and falls to be assessed on the facts of each case. In the case of all other applicants, however, section 1(2)(b) makes clear that reasonable financial provision means such provision as it would be reasonable for the applicant to receive for maintenance. “… where it is required in order to give effect to an occupier’s article 8 Convention rights, the court’s powers of review can, top advocates in Supreme Court India an appropriate case, extend to reconsidering for itself the facts found by a local authority, or indeed to considering facts which have arisen since the issue of proceedings, by hearing evidence and forming its own view.
Nor, although maintenance is by definition the provision of income rather than capital, need it necessarily be provided for by way of periodical payments, for example under a trust. However, they said that, until the Senior Liabilities had been paid in full, the subordinated debt would be a contingent debt, and because of the terms of the Loan, the correct value to ascribe to such a proof before the Senior Liabilities have all been paid would be nil, as nothing could be paid on the proof.
There may be other cases appropriate for lump sums; the provision of a vehicle to enable the claimant to get to work might be one example and, as will be seen, the present case affords another. As Browne-Wilkinson J envisaged (obiter) best advocates in Supreme Court India In re Dennis (above) there is no reason why the provision of housing should not be maintenance in some cases; families have for generations provided for the maintenance of relatives, and indeed for others such as former employees, by housing them.
They did so by reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Saga Cob [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 545, 551, where, in the context of political risks, Parker LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said this: Immediately after quoting an extensive passage from the speech of Lord Roskill in The Evia (No 2), most of which is quoted above, in para 52 the Court of Appeal said that its import was clear.
It is not limited to subsistence level. The supplementary provisions of section 3(2) add for applicants in that limited class the direction to the court to have regard to the provision that the spouse or civil partner might have been expected to obtain in the event of divorce or dissolution, so that the assessment of this kind of claim may well be an exercise similar to that undertaken by the family court on an application for financial remedies after divorce or dissolution with, of course, the difference that the other spouse or partner is now dead.
If and when the Senior Liabilities were met in full, the Court of Appeal said that the proof in respect of the subordinated debt would be revalued pursuant to rule 2. If housing is provided by way of maintenance, it is likely more often to be provided by such a life interest rather than by a capital sum. The Court of Appeal further noted in para 52 that the concept of safety is necessarily not an absolute one. The concept of “reasonable financial provision” is thus, by the closing words of section 1(1), made central to the jurisdiction to depart from the will or intestacy rules, as the case may be.
Munby J (as he then was) rightly made this point clear in In re Myers [2004] EWHC 1944 (Fam); [2005] WTLR 851 at paras 89-90 and 99-101. 79 – see at [2016] Ch 50, para 41.