Read Homepage; go to these guys, Here again, the distinction in the mind of the consumer arises not from any difference in the essential identity of the two, but is derived from the mere form in which the fruit is desired. 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 infringe mouse click the next page Art. n28) This brings us to the validity of second notification. The submission is that there is inequality of treatment as between Hindu religious trusts on one hand and Sikh religious trusts on the other, the latter having been excluded from the purview of the Act; secondly, there is inequality of treatment even as between Hindu religious trusts and Jain religious trusts, though both come under the Act.
2 does riot include Sikhs; and s. We do not 571 think that there is any substance in this contention. 41 acres of land has been acquired vide notification No. As already mentioned above, 55. (c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation for applying for regular recruitment provided that they were eligible on the date of their first temporary appointment for securing regular appointment with the Life Insurance Corporation. 2010 and the public purpose stated is “Development of Urban Estate, mainly to adjust oustees of Missing Link-II (Dhandra Road to Sidhwan Canal via Malerkotla Road, Ludhiana)”.
It was also argued that in the process, the changes which made were much more serious violating the master plan. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 581. It was argued that mouse click the following internet site the next page (have a peek here) public purpose of “residential” has been held by this Court to be vague in Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. It is pointed out that the definition of the word ‘ Hindu’ in s. 6, 7 and 8 the constitution of the Board for religious trusts other than Jain religious trusts differs in material particulars from the constitution of the two Boards for Jain religious trusts.
The first contention is that the provisions in ss. It was also argued that the aforesaid stated purpose is totally vague, since it only says that the same is for the development of a residential urban estate. 14 of the Constitution had come up for discussion before this Court in a number of earlier cases (see the cases referred to in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. 14 of the Constitution. First of all, reliance was placed on Tarsem Singh v. Although a degree of processing is involved in preparing pineapple slices from the original fruit, the commodity continues to possess its original identity, notwithstanding the removal of inedible portions, the slicing and thereafter canning it on adding sugar to preserve it.
It is said that pineapple slices appeal to a different sector of the trade and that when a customer asks for a cane of pineapple slices he had in mind something very different from mouse click the next page fresh pineapple fruit. The higher price, it seems to us, is occasioned only because of the labour put into making the fruit more readily consumable and because of the cane employed to contain it. It is not as if the higher price is claimed because it is a different commercially commodity.
The clause, truly read, speaks of goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale or goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for purposes other than sale. It is contended for the Revenue that pineapple slices have a higher price in the market than the original fruit and that implies that the slices constitute a different commercial commodity. Where any difficulty or doubt arises in applying this sub- rule, seniority shall be determined by the appointing authority The main plank of attack of the appellants to this notification is that land of the appellants could not be acquired to rehabilitate other persons, and in the process rendering the appellants homeless and landless.
There is a fallacy in the submission. It is further pointed out that under ss. The provisions of Art. Such an action was arbitrary and illegal which also amounted to depriving the appellants of their livelihood. Learned counsel for the Revenue contends that even if no manufacturing process involved, the case still falls within Section 5(1)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, because mouse click the next page the statutory provision speaks not only of goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale but also goods consumed otherwise.
n(c) The transfer of a person from one class or category of the service to another class or category carrying the same pay or scale of pay shall not be treated as first appointment to the latter for purposes of seniority and the seniority of person so transferred shall be determined with reference to the date of his first appointment to class or category from which he was transferred. It was in the instant context, that the learned counsel invited our attention to some judgments rendered by this Court.
The comment applies fully in the case before us. We proceed now to consider the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants. Our pointed attention was invited to the following observations recorded therein: And in that view of the matter, the contention, that the satisfaction recorded by the disciplinary authority does not constitute a valid satisfaction in the eyes of law. 5 constitutes a Board for religious trusts other than Jain religious trusts, and also two separate Boards-one for Swetambar Jain religious trusts and the other for Digambar Jain religious trusts.