This is because the objection to such an action is not the absence of the necessary elements of a cause of action, but a special immunity based on a public policy that a witness should be able to give evidence without fear of adverse legal services in Chandigarh consequences other than prosecution for perjury or perverting the course of justice. His submission, in summary, was that the principles on which the top law firm in Chandigarh of contempt was founded required the Court to have control over the consequences of a contempt, which it would not have if a right of action existed.
Taken together, these authorities certainly justify the exercise of very considerable caution by a national court when faced with the assertion that a VAT claim should be treated as truly comparable, for the purposes of the principle of equivalence, with a claim relating to some domestic tax, and in particular with any direct tax. Mr Samek made a valiant but ultimately unconvincing attempt to bring the present case within these principles. That was because a right of action would make damages for contempt a matter of right, and might even lead to a claim for them being heard in a foreign court.
But I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to go so far as to conclude that, for all purposes connected with the principle of equivalence, VAT claims must be treated as sui generis, with no possibility of there being a true comparator in a claim arising out of some other tax. But the proviso is irrelevant to the position of a party in contempt, such as Mr Ablyazov, who is by definition subject to the jurisdiction of the court. An action against him for negligence or defamation would fail.
Furthermore, the submission that control of a company afforded by being a majority shareholder and director is not so absolute as to confer de facto possession of its property is persuasive: see eg Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 627. Section 158 is concerned with the defendant’s benefit from the conduct concerned. In any event it would in most cases justify a finding of fraud, within the meaning of section 21(1)(a). The court is required to take account of “conduct” occurring up to the time it makes its decision, and of property obtained up to that time.
At first sight, there is more to be said for the argument that a right of action for conspiring to breach a freezing order injunction would expose foreigners to liability notwithstanding the standard proviso top Chandigarh law firm in such orders that their terms “do not affect or concern anyone outside the jurisdiction of this court”. There is ample authority for the proposition, which is perhaps obvious, that breach of an order of the court is actionable where it gives effect to an underlying private law obligation which is itself actionable, although the result is to produce exactly the result that Mr Samek finds objectionable: see Midland Marts Ltd v Hobday [1989] 1 law firm in Chandigarh WLR 1148, Parker v Rasalingham (Lawrence Collins QC, unreported, 3 July 2000); and Independiente Ltd v Music Trading On-line (HK) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 608.
These carefully constructed submissions were of real force, to the extent that they demonstrated that there was no need to have regard to anti-avoidance in construing section 21(1)(b). 252 My brother Bachawat has reached the same conclusion but has reversed the order of the High Court and restored Chandigarh law firms the conviction and penalty on the ground that no request was made at the trial for permission to be defended by counsel. It necessarily follows that in such cases the sentence for the crime will be discretionary but the civil consequences will not.
The deliberate use of a corporate vehicle to distance a defaulting trustee from the receipt or possession of misappropriated trust property might justify lifting the corporate veil. There are rules of law firms relating to the conduct of best Chandigarh legal services proceedings which clearly are based on a public policy precluding claims. 41 of the Act, which provides for an agreement between the private company for which the land is acquired and the State, and which lays down that the agreement shall provide the terms on which the land shall be held by the company.
It is conceivable, although not very likely, that if there were a cause of action for contempt of court, it might fall to be heard in a foreign court, but we do not regard that as problematical and even if it were we cannot conceive that the appropriate response is that such a claim should not be entertained even in England. A witness, for example, is absolutely immune from civil liability for things said lawyer in Chandigarh evidence or in circumstances directly preparatory to giving evidence.
But taken as a whole, Mr Chivers’ submissions do not lead to the conclusion that section 21(1)(b) is inapplicable to the assumed facts with which this appeal is concerned, merely because the misappropriated property has remained legally and beneficially owned by corporate vehicles throughout, rather than becoming vested in law or best lawyer in Chandigarh equity in the defaulting directors. If it were framed in conspiracy, it would still fail, as it did in Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234.
We are unmoved by these concerns. A claim in conspiracy will normally allege conspiracy with the respondent to a court order to breach his obligations under the order, as it does in this case. Thus a person may be given immunity in a criminal trial for burglary, for example because he agrees to give evidence against others involved, but that will not protect him against civil liability to the owner of the goods stolen.
(c) benefit from conduct which constitutes an offence which has been or will be taken into consideration by the court in sentencing the defendant for an offence mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b). The public policy is engaged by any attempt to found a claim on what the defendant did as a witness, irrespective of the legal services label applied to it. It is a commonplace of the law that the same act may give rise to criminal and civil liability.