Rejoinder thereto was filed by the appellant. Notifications dated 10. The rule of law on this subject has been thus stated by Dicey: “The courts of a foreign country have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title or the right to the possession of any immoveable property not situate in such country. The appellants contend that there can be no doubt that courts in this country have no jurisdiction to determine questions of title in respect of immoveable properties in foreign countries or to direct a division thereof.
This position is not and cannot be disputed. In that event, the court within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the company is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not actually be carrying on business at that place, it will be deemed to carry on business at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. 2007 and all consequential actions are quashed. Thereafter, another counter affidavit on merits was filed by the respondent no.
But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural jsutice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. “(1) It is also urged that where a lawyer Supreme Court of India has no jurisdiction to determine any (1) Dicey’s ” Conflict of Laws “, 6th Ed. , the ground 306 covered by s. The appellant filed rejoinder to this counter affidavit controverting the stand which was taken by the respondent. 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act.
The ultimate test is always the same, viz. Ex facie this sub-paragraph does not refer to s. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing.
The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not. ” That apart from the above mentioned reasons the nomination paper of the respondent was also improperly accepted by the Returning Officer, in-asmuch-as, the respondent having been dismissed from Government Service did not obtain a certificate in the prescribed manner from the Election Commission to the effect that he had not been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State.
Therefore, every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that order passed is always null and void. ” This sub-paragraph in clear and unambiguous terms raises the ground of improper acceptance of the nomination paper by the Returning Officer i. Nothing has been elicited in the course of cross-examination of any of these witnesses which would detract from the weight of their evidence.
The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to return of compensation received by them under agreement/award to the Collector. The reason for sustaining the said ground is stated to be that, having been dismissed from Government service, he did not obtain a certificate in the prescribed manner from the Election Commission. , the test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken.
The validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of ‘prejudice’. A nomination paper may be accepted by the Returning Officer in spite of one or other of the following two defects: (i) the candidate who has been dismissed may have filed the nomination -paper without its being accompanied by a certificate issued in the prescribed manner by the Election Commission to the effect that he has not been dismissed from service for corruption or dis loyalty to the State: vide s.
33(3); and (ii) the candidate has been disqualified for being chosen as a member of Parliament: 33(3) or to the contents of that sub- section. The expression at such place appearing in the Explanation and the word or which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the advocate Supreme Court of India within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone has the jurisdiction in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office.
The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place. They are natural witnesses who could with authority speak to the affairs of the family. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIoN: Civil Appeal No, 173 of 1955, 255 Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 9, 1949, of the former Nagpur High Supreme Court of India advocates, in first appeal No.
In this counter affidavit, stand was taken by the respondents that MPSC would not apply to appellant’s two PSCs. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. 45 of 1944, arising out of the judgment and decree dated April 24, 1944, of the First Additional District Judge, Nagpur, in Civil Suit No.