2 of the same would be applicable and should be a part of the PSCs. This clause has reference to the offence punishable under s. though mentions about the applicability of fiscal, there is no reference to Section 42 of the Act in this Clause. It is the specific finding of the Trial Court that the transfer of Suit schedule lands to the Household Department in the year 1951 is without any authority and therefore bad; the Ruler paid the Tauzi from 1951, but there is no evidence to show that Tauzi was paid for the period prior to 1951; the correspondence entered into by the plaintiff and her father with the Government showed that the Suit scheduled properties were not included in Item No.
It is also observed that there is no document or clause in the bid given by the appellant under the 1992 NIT to the effect that the MPSC or clause 16. 165 of the Code; and there. 38 Even if the Wage Board is held to be a quasijudicial body, it acted according to the principle of audi alteram partem and no prerogative writ should be issued to disturb findings arrived at by such a body. It is pointed out that the 1992 NIT did not refer to the MPSC and did not stipulate that MPSC shall form part of the tender documents.
If that is the true position in respect of the construction of this part of s. 4(1) it would be unreasonable to hold that the word ” gratification ” in the same clause imports the necessity to prove not only the payment 601 of money but the incriminating character of the said payment. In the tender submitted by the appellant there was no specific stipulation to include any clause with regard to the benefit under Section 42 of the Act. In other words the High Supreme Court of India lawyers did not consider the prosecution evidence apart from the presumption since 596 it placed its decision on the presumption and the failure of the defence to rebut it.
We would accordingly hold that in the present appeal the High Supreme Court of India advocates was justified in raising the presumption against the appellant because it is admitted by him that he received Rs. (1) Whether benefit under Section 42 of the Act was envisaged in the 1992 NIT and in the PSCs, but due to oversight or mistake, the same was not included and mentioned in the written contract, and if so, the effect thereof? The presumption has also to be raised when it is shown that the accused person has received any valuable thing.
(2) If the question is decided in favour of the appellant, the second aspect is whether a direction can be issued for grant of benefit under Section 42 of the Act to the appellant, with a further direction that the contract should be laid before the Parliament after incorporating the said clause? There is another consideration which supports this construction. It is further stated by the High Court that in 1992 NII, there was no reference to MPSC or that the terms and conditions of the MPSC shall be included in, or be a part of, the PSCs.
Dealing with the first question, High Supreme Court of India advocates rejected the plea of the appellant that 1992 NIT included and referred to the MPSC as incorrect. The Trial Court after remand framed 24 issues, and after appreciating both oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the Suit by judgement and decree dated 17-08-2001. In the result the conviction of the appellant was confirmed, the sentence passed against him under s. 78; the plaintiff was not in possession of the Suit schedule properties either in the form of ordinary tenant, Government lessee or land owner; that the Suit schedule lands were not allotted to the Forest Department by the State; and ultimately, the Trial Court held that in view of bar contained in Article 363 of the Constitution of India, the Suit is not maintainable.
4(1) which deals with the acceptance of any valuable thing should be interpreted to impose upon the prosecution an obligation to prove not only that the valuable thing has been received by the accused but that it has been received by him without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. The High Court has further observed that written contracts were signed between the appellant and MoPNG in the name of President on 20. 161 was maintained but the sentence under s.
It is true that the Legislature might have used the word ” money ” or ” consideration ” as has been done by the relevant section of the English statute; but if the dictionary meaning of the word ” gratification ” fits in with the scheme of the section and leads to the same result as the meaning of the word ” valuable thing ” mentioned in the same clause, we see no justification for adding any clause to qualify the word ” gratification”; the view for which the appellant contends in effect amounts to adding a qualifying clause to describe gratification.
It cannot be suggested that the relevant clause in s. The plain meaning of this clause undoubtedly requires the presumption to be raised whenever it is shown that the valuable thing has been received by the accused without anything more. Clause 15 of these contracts which pertain to Taxes, Royalties, Rentals, Customs duties etc. is no doubt that one of the essential ingredients of the said offence is that the valuable thing should have been received by the accused without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate.