311 and was therefore a valid order. It seems to us that in furnishing the ground to the landlord the legislature intended to give only a limited protection to the tenant or to put it slightly differently, the legislature intended to give protection only to a tenant who was diligent and regular enough in the matter of payment of rent. The next question is whether, as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor-General, the default made by the defendant in failing to pay the arrears within one month of the receipt of the notice dated April 11, 1959, can be said to have been waived by the plaintiffs.
Among these newly added was Tehsil Huzur Advocates In High Court Chandigarh which the lands of the petitioners who number thirty, were situate. The State of Punjab(4) and Madan Gopal v. “In principle, we cannot see any clear distinction between the termination of the services of a person under the terms of a contract governing him and the termination of his services in accordance with the terms of his conditions of service. Thereafter on February 4, 1953, a communication was addressed by the Land Reclamation Officer, Bhopal to the Tahsildar, Huzur among other Tahsils which read, to quote the material passage: 4(1) of the Ordinance declaring all the villages in seven tehsils which were set out in it as “Kans areas” and this was published in the Gazette on January 27, 1951.
Then again when the plaintiffs cashed the cheque they had not filed a suit on the basis of the notice of April 11, 1959. The tenancy, as was indeed argued by the learned Additional Solicitor- General, hah not be-en validly terminated by the notice of April 11 , 1959 and therefore the relationship of landlord and tenant continued. But, ultimately when the appellant started unnecessary criticism of the work done by them and even withholding some running payments the partners of the firm decided to pay commission to him as demanded.
There is no 251 substance in the plea made on their behalf that they had received the amount under protest. The reason is quite simple. Gopi Kishore’ Prasad(2) State of Orissa & Anr. The State of Punjab & Qrs. What we have stated regarding Civil Appeal 379 of 1959 would equally apply to them. they do not require to be dealt with separately. The 633 first payment, it is said, was made on March 21, 1949 and further payments were thereafter made from time to time.
It is no doubt true that by cashing the cheque for Rs. Union of India(1) State of Bihar v. Subsequently on November 21, 1952, there was a notification stating inter alia that 10 named villages in Tehsil Huzur were being taken over for tractorisation operations “during the ensuing season” and after this these operations were conducted on the lands of the petitioners. Consequently the plaintiffs were within their right Top Advocates In Chandigarh High Court accepting the rent and cannot be fastened with the intention to waive the default just because of this action since the defendant was, by virtue of the Accomodation Act entitled to remain in possession as tenant and liable to pay rent.
” The proposition that it is not every termination of service of an employee that falls within the operation of Art. This aspect of the matter has Chandigarh High Court Lawyers been considered by this Chandigarh High Court Advocates in several recent decisions, vide Jagdish Mitter v. Even so, it is difficult to infer, merely from the acceptance of the payment, a, waiver of the right which had accrued to them under s. Merely saying that they accepted the money under protest is, therefore, of no avail to them. Needless to add that this amendment was also published in the Gazette.
The facts of the other appeals being substantially similar, and the points arising in them being identical. 31 1 and that it is only when the order is by way of punishment that it is one of dismissal or removal was reaffirmed by this Senior Advocates Chandigarh High Court in Balakotich v. Indeed, while it is open to a legislature to give wide protection to ever defaulting tenants, it does not follow from it that whenever it gives protection it must be deemed to have given him the protection of the widest amplitude.
In the first place this is not a case to which illustration (a) to s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act then even though it was ineffective the acceptance of rent by the plaintiffs on July 4, 1959 amounted to a waiver of the right accruing from the notice. 4(a) of the Act in consequence of the default made by the defendant in paying arrears of rent. The order complained against did not contravene the provisions of Art. 113 of the Transfer of Property Act which says that acceptance of rent falling due after the expiry of a notice to quit amounts to waiver of the notice applies.
This notification was amended by a further notification dated May 30, 1951 by which all the villages in two more tehsils were added to the original seven. The Union of India (3 ). The learned Additional Chandigarh High Court Top Lawyers Solicitor-General, however, faintly contended that if the notice of April 11, 1959 could also be construed as being intended to be notice under s. 1,320 on July 4, 1959 the plaintiffs received not merely the arrears of rent up to March, 1959 but also rent upto June 30, 1959.