Two grounds of law are urged in support of this. The purchase of a business with a view to closing it down would not appear to constitute succession. The appellant contends that as soon as the partition of India took place that registration caused to be effective for that part of the old British India which became the Dominion of alia and it so continued to be ineffective for this 1000 entire area also after the Constitution of India came into force.
The fact that the purchaser already has a similar business is not a material fact in establishing succession. But such establishments were not included Revenue Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court that register because of the failure of the owners to register them. 320(3) (c) to a statutory 977 provision like the one which came up for consideration in Montreal Street Railway Company’s case(1) and held that if the Article were construed as mandatory, it would cause serious general inconvenience, and injustice to persons who had no control over those entrusted with the duty.
There is nothing on the record to discredit these statements. In our opinion, this argument is wholly unsound. We have already noticed that s. 85 of the Factories Act when the enquiries were over. But if a business is taken over as a whole, High Court Civil Advocates the fact that minor assets of the business are omitted from the transfer will not prevent there being a succession. In order to constitute a succession there must be, broadly speaking, a taking over of the whole of the business concerned;.
Once there was registration under the Indian Partnership Act that registration in our opinion, continues to operate as registration under that Act and continues to be effective-in other words, valid registration in the eye of law as administered in India so long as the registration is not cancelled in accordance with law. ” He further stated that probably there were other bidi manufacturing establishments to which the provisions of the Factories Act were applicable, but these factories were not within the purview of the impugned Notification because they were not on the register of factories maintained under the Factories Act and on the basis of which the impugned Noti- fication was issued.
He further stated that the impugned Notification was issued to maintain industrial peace and harmony. Pimenta said that the Government was making enquiries about such other factories and that they would or would not be brought under the purview of the Act, as circumstances demanded, by amendment of the impugned notification under s. 31 empowers a person having an interest to institute a suit for obtaining any of the 638 reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (e) of that section.
As a result of the clarification of the legal position by the decision of this Court Revenue Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court Shankar Balagi Waje’s case (1), there was grave unrest among bidi rollers and the State Government felt obliged to intervene for the protection of bidi rollers against deprivation of benefits previously accorded to them for an appreciable length of time, and with that object in view in the first instance applied the provisions of the Factories Act by Notification issued under s/85(1) to all such (1) [1962] Supp.
320 would adversely affect the person so appointed to a public service, without any fault on ‘his part and without his having any say in the matter, and this ‘could not have been intended by the makers of the Constitution. The entire Province of Punjab was then within British India; there was one Registrar for the entire Province and it is not disputed that registration made by the Registrar whose office was at Lahore was up to August 14, 1947 good registration for the whole of what was then British India.
That case therefore in the circumstances is of little assistance to the respondent, except insofar as it lays down the principle that no general rule can be laid down for determining the question whether a provision in a statute is directory or mandatory, and that every case will have to be judged on the basis of the object of the statute concerned. It is argued that the Registrar of the Punjab, within his office at Lahore, ceased to be a Registrar under the Indian Act, when on the partition of India Lahore became part of a foreign country.
37 which has been struck down by the Chandigarh High Court Civil Advocates Court on the ground that it can be utilised as a defence to a suit under s. Accordingly, the Government of Maharashtra issued the impugned Notification including therein those factories which were on the register of Factories main- tained by the Chief Inspector of Factories. So, it is said, the registration became the registration of a foreign country and thus ceased to be a registration for India.
As the Judicial Committee itself pointed out the question whether provisions in a statute are directory or mandatory cannot be decided by laying down a general rule and in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. It is no longer disputed that the firm was registered by the Registrar of Firms, Punjab, on August 16, 1946, under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, as it stood on that date. Before, the impugned Notification was issued, the Bombay and other High Courts had held that bidi workers who though not servants of the owners of the bidi factories in which they were working, were still employed in a manufacturing process to whom the benefits of the Factories Act were admissible.
That was an order made before the partition of India took place. ‘Thus this Court approximated Art. 85 of the Factories’ 879 Act, 1948 should be issued. The first is based on the requirement of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. That decision was clearly based on the special facts in that case dealing with appointments and dismissals of public servants and the duty of the Government to consult the, Public Service Commission in that behalf and cannot and should not be extended to cases based on a different set of facts.